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STATE OF UTAH, 
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Case No. 960271-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (e) (1996) (appeals for a court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first 
degree felony). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
(a) Whether the observations of Sergeant Evans rose to 
the level of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity? 
(b) Whether Agent Eckman's Search Team had reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause to search the premises of Mr. Davis 
and Ms. Hyatt? 
(c) Whether the Fourth Amendment waiver in Mr. Davis1 
probationary agreement violated Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
State Constitution? 
(d) Whether the exploitation of the Fourth Amendment 
waiver in Mr. Davis1 probation agreement violated Ms. Hyatt's 
Article I, section 14 Constitutional Right protecting her against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
(e) Whether the trial court committed reversible error 
by allowing prisoner testimony without Mr. Davis first being 
provided discovery regarding testimony? 
(f) Whether the trial court erred when it allowed 
testimony to be presented to the jury about alleged illegal 
conduct by the defendants on other occasions under the guise of 
removing mistake of identity of the defendants? 
(g) Whether the misconduct of the prosecutor was 
prejudicial to the defendants? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
(a) - (b) The observations of Sergeant Evans did not 
rise to a level of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity nor 
did Agent Eckman's Search Team have reasonable suspicion to 
search the premises of Mr. Davis and Ms. Hyatt, therefore the 
trial court should have dismissed this matter. 
Standard of Review: We conclude that the proper 
standard of review to be applied to a trial court 
determination of whether a specific set of facts gives 
rise to reasonable suspicion is a determination of law 
and is reviewable nondeferentially for correctness, as 
opposed to being a fact determination reviewable for 
clear error. We further conclude that the 
reasonable-suspicion legal standard is one that conveys 
a measure of discretion to the trial judge when 
applying that standard to a given set of facts. 
Precisely how much discretion we cannot say, but we 
would not anticipate a close, de novo review. On the 
2 
other hand, a sufficiently careful review is necessary 
to assure that the purposes of the reasonable-suspicion 
requirement are served. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
(c - d) The Fourth Amendment waiver in Mr. Davis1 
probationary agreement violated Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
State Constitution for both co-defendants. 
Standard of Review: In reviewing a trial court's 
determination that reasonable suspicion justified a 
Fourth Amendment search or seizure, we apply two 
different standards of review—one to the trial court's 
factual findings and the other to its legal 
conclusions. The trial court's factual findings 
underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress evidence are examined for clear error. State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). On the other 
hand, the standard to be applied to the conclusion of 
law, i.e., whether the facts as found give rise to 
reasonable suspicion, "is reviewable nondeferentially 
for correctness, as opposed to being a fact 
determination reviewable for clear error." Pena, 869 
P.2d at 939. Nevertheless, the nature of this 
particular determination of law allows the trial court 
"a measure of discretion . . . when applying that 
standard to a given set of facts." 
State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994). 
(e - g) The trial court committed reversible error by 
allowing prisoner testimony without both co-defendants first 
being provided discovery regarding testimony. This evidence was 
admitted regarding the defendant's prior conduct which prejudice 
greatly out-weighed its probative value, especially in the light 
of the fact that the existence of this individual was never 
disclosed to the defendants until during the second day of trial. 
Standard of Review: Because the admission of evidence 
under Rule 404(b) is a question "of law, it is reviewed 
for correctness. However, the trial court's subsidiary 
factual determinations should be given deference by the 
appellate court and only be overruled when they are 
clearly erroneous." State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568 
(Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted); see also State v. 
Thurman, No. 910494, slip op. at 17-19 n.ll (Utah Jan. 
3 
7, 1993) (recognizing bifurcated standard when appeals 
court reviews underlying factual findings). When 
reviewing a trial court's balancing of the 
probativeness of a piece of evidence against its 
potential for unfair prejudice under Rule 403, we 
reverse only if the court's decision as a matter of law 
"was beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992). Improperly 
admitted evidence requires reversal of a conviction 
only where we conclude there is a "'reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings.1" Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240 (quoting State 
v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)). 
State v. O'Niel, 848 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1993). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah R. Evid. 403 Utah Const, art. I, § 7 
Utah R. Evid. 404 Utah Const, art. I, § 11 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14 Utah Const, art. I, § 24 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case: 
This case arises out of guilty verdicts from a 
trial in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron County, 
Utah. 
II. Course of the Proceedings: 
The court, having original jurisdiction conducted 
several pretrial hearings, including a suppression of evidence 
hearing. The Honorable J. Phillip Eves heard the Motion to 
Suppress Hearing and denied it. On December 7-8, 1995, the trial 
court judge, the Honorable Robert T. Braithewaite, denied same 
motion renewed by the co-Defendants1 counsel. Then the court 
conducted a jury trial that carried through to December 8, 1995. 
Therein, the defendants were convicted of all counts alleged in 
jury 
State of 
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the information. 
III. Disposition in Trial Court: 
The jury entered a Guilty verdict and the co-Defendants 
were sentenced, including Davis1 incarceration in the Utah State 
Prison. 
IV. Statement of Facts: 
1. The defendant Davis pled guilty to a charge of theft, a 
class A Misdemeanor, in Kane County and was placed on probation 
as a result thereof. Because Mr. Davis lived in Cedar City, 
probation was assigned to Iron County. 
2. On November 21, 1994, Sergeant Rick Evans of the Iron 
County Sheriff!s Office was in the city of Summit at about 2:00 
a.m. (TT. at 62-64). 
3. He was involved in a surveillance of a residence. (TT. 
at 62-64). 
4. While at the location of 100 South on the "backroads of 
Summit" Sergeant Evans observed a light brown van bearing South 
Dakota license plates drive around the corner and up the street. 
(TT. at 62-64). 
5. The van slowed down as though it were going to pull 
into the driveway of the residence under surveillance and then it 
drove off. (TT. at 62-64). 
6. He then followed the van to the Sunshine Truck Stop. 
(TT. at 62-64). 
7. Sergeant Evans followed the van into the truck stop 
then exited his vehicle and approached the driver. (TT. at 62-
64). 
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8. Sergeant Evans asked the driver who he was to which the 
driver replied, "I'm Chick Davis." (TT. at 62-64). 
9. Questions were then asked about the van and the reason 
for Davis' presence in Summit. His response was that ever since 
his son was killed he drives around when he can't sleep. (TT. at 
67-68). 
10. This information was then passed on to other officers, 
including Mr. Davis' probation officer, Agent Bob Eckman of Adult 
Probation and Parole. (TT. at 66). 
11. Sometime after the report by Sergeant Evans to Agent 
Eckman, Agent Eckman planned to visit Davis. (TT. at 72). 
12. The purpose of the visitation was to check on Davis' 
compliance with the previously imposed extra-judicial terms of 
the probation agreement and to follow up suspicions deduced from 
Sergeant Evans1 report. (TT. at 72). 
13. On November 15, 1994, Agent Eckman's search team had 
visited the residence belonging to Mr. Davis pursuant to an 
extra-judicial modification of Mr. Davis's probation agreement. 
14. A search of Mr. Davis1 and a co-defendant's, Holly 
Hyatt, residence and vehicles was conducted. 
15. There was no warrant obtained nor sought at any time 
during the search of both defendants' residence or vehicles. 
(TT. at 76) 
16. At no time was consent obtained from either Mr. Davis 
or Ms. Hyatt to search either the residence or the vehicles. 
17. Through the course of the search, the team discovered 
large amounts of drug contraband and paraphernalia. 
18. A motion to suppress evidence was conducted before the 
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Honorable J. Philip Eves on two dates, September 5, 1995 and 
October 3, 1995. The Court denied Mr. Davis1 motion, 
19. As a result, a jury trial was conducted on December 8, 
1995 where surprise witness(es) were utilized from the Utah State 
Prison, who were not previously disclosed to Mr. Davis or his 
counsel. 
20. The conviction included possession of stolen property. 
21. The allegedly stolen property was two electric tools, a 
router and a staple gun. 
22. The staple gun was never reported stolen. 
23. There was no testimony that the staple gun had ever 
been stolen. (TT. 385). 
24. The router was reported stolen over one year prior to 
the router being found in the defendant's possession. (TT. at 
384). 
25. The router had no serial or identification number or 
other mark which would assist anyone in identifying the owner. 
(TT. at 383). 
26. The victim further testified that he did not suspect 
the defendant of having stolen any of his property. (TT. at 
397). 
27. At the time of the trial in this matter there were two 
small bindles of cocaine which were offered as exhibits. 
28. They were the only two items dealing with possession of 
cocaine. 
29. The items were not of sufficient quantity to show 
possession with intent to distribute. 
30. At the time of the trial in this matter Robert Eckman, 
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who was Davis's probation officer, testified that there were two 
individuals who pulled up to the front of Defendant's residence 
while officers were performing their search of the co-defendant's 
residence. 
31. At the preliminary examination in this matter Agent 
Eckman testified that the two individuals were Steve Lambert and 
Doyle Gosler. 
32. At the hearing for the Motion to Suppress Evidence, 
Agent Eckman testified that the two individuals were Steve 
Lambert and somebody named Sullivan. 
33. At the time of trial in this matter Agent Eckman 
testified that the individuals were Steve Lambert and Danny 
Balduck. 
34. The Court allowed Danny Balduck to testify about 
numerous occasions (about 15) wherein he claimed to have 
purchased controlled substances from the defendant. 
35. The prosecutor argued that Mr. Balduck?s testimony was 
to prevent mistake of identity as to the defendant Davis. 
36. At no time in any proceeding, at trial or any of the 
hearings which preceded trial was this raised as a defense. 
37. At trial there was no limiting instruction given as the 
Court agreed to give as to Danny Balducks's testimony. 
38. That the testimony of Danny Balduck was intended to 
prejudice to jury. 
39. There were many officers who testified that they knew 
the defendant personally. There was no chance for a mistake as 
to identity. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The co-Defendants were erroneously convicted due to 
certain constitutional violations of which are matters of law 
where no discretion is deferred to the trial court. The co-
Defendants were denied their Fourth Amendment rights by Davis's 
probation officers. Hyatt never waived her protections. 
All in all, the entire case cascaded from the officers1 
lack of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The officers 
began their investigation of Davis based on his propinquity with 
others. The co-Defendants were never subject to or suspected of 
possessing drugs or stolen property as alleged in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Preface. 
As the Utah State Supreme Court has stated: 
In Utah# the supreme court has, in addition to common 
law power, constitutional authority to manage the 
appellate process, Utah Const, art. V, § 1, art. VIII, 
§§ 1, 4, as well as inherent supervisory authority over 
all courts of this State. E.g., State v. Brown, 201 
Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 7 (Nov. 30, 1992); State v. Gardner, 
789 P.2d 273, 290 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); State 
v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 458 (Utah 1989); State v. 
James, 767 P.2d 549, 557 (Utah 1989); In re Criminal 
Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 653 (Utah 1988); State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 499 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in the result); In re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 
1076, 1081 (Utah 1985). Unless constrained by a 
constitutional or statutory provision, we exercise our 
powers to fashion standards of review that we think 
best allocate responsibility between appellate and 
trial courts in light of the particular determination 
under review. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that 
the allocation of responsibility, or discretion, 
between trial and appellate courts is a matter of 
peculiar and close importance to the courts in 
question, and we see no reason why our authority to 
define standards of review should not extend to cases 
where the determination under review is a question of 
federal law. 
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State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). The Thurman Court 
went on to explain, in pertinent part: 
It is widely agreed that the primary function of a 
standard of review is to apportion power and, 
consequently, responsibility between trial and 
appellate courts for determining an issue or class of 
issues. See, e.g., State v. Sykes, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 
35, 38 (Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1992) (Jackson, J., 
concurring); Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 36 
(D.C. 1989); Paul D. Carrington et al., Justice on 
Appeal 130 (1976); Patrick W. Brennan, Standards of 
Appellate Review, 33 Def. L.J. 377, 377 (1984); Ronald 
R. Hofer, Standards of Review — Looking Beyond the 
Labels, 74 Marq. L. Rev. 231, 232 (1991) [hereinafter 
Hofer]; Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 
85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 234-35 (1985) [hereinafter 
Monaghan]. Put another way, a standard of review 
allocates discretion between trial and appellate 
courts. In determining the appropriateness of a 
particular allocation of responsibility for deciding an 
issue or class of issues, account should be taken of 
the relative capabilities of each level of the court 
system to take evidence and make findings of fact in 
the face of conflicting evidence, on the one hand, and 
to set binding jurisdiction-wide policy, on the other. 
See, e.g.. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114-15 
(1985); United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125, 126-27 
(3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Dauqhtrey, 874 F.2d 
213, 217-18 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. McConney, 
728 F.2d 1195, 1201-02 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert, 
denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); Davis, 564 A.2d at 36-37. 
In short, the choice of the appropriate standard of 
review "turns on a determination that, as a matter of 
the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor 
is better positioned than another to decide the issue 
in question." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 
559-60 (1988) (quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 114); accord 
Salve Regina College v. Russell, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1222 
(1991). See generally Hofer at 237-41. 
Id. In other words, the Utah Supreme Court absent an expressed 
Federal Law limiting the Courtfs power is free to govern itself 
and rule on Utah matters free and clear of out-of-state 
influences. 
POINT I. 
SERGEANT EVANS LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION 
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OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY TO INITIATE AN INVESTIGATION, 
All searches by the police are per se illegal, unless 
they are conducted pursuant to the authority of a warrant, or in 
the alternative conducted pursuant to one of several specific 
exceptions which have been enumerated by the court. See, Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
The Utah State Constitution provides in pertinent part: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Const. Art. I § 14. 
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2632, 66 L.Ed.2d 
357 (1979) sets forth the principle that the Fourth Amendment 
applies to all seizures of the person, including detention short 
of traditional arrests. Whenever a police officer accosts an 
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 
"seized" that person and the Fourth Amendment requires that the 
seizure be reasonable. 
The Supreme Court goes on to state that the 
reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a 
traditional arrest depends upon the "balance between the public 
interest and the individualf s right to personal security free 
from arbitrary interference by law officers." 
To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a 
seizure of a particular individual must be based upon 
specific, objective facts indicating that society's 
legitimate interests require the seizure of the 
particular individual or that the seizure must be 
carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, 
neutral limitation on the conduct of the individual 
officer. 
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Brown v. Texas, Supra, p. 363, L.Ed. 
In State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed this requirement by acknowledging three 
levels of police encounters with the public that are 
constitutionally permissible: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] 
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not 
detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an 
"articulable suspicion" that the person has committed 
or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention 
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of the stop"; 
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
probable cause to believe an offense has been committed 
or is being committed. 
Id. at 617-18; quoting. United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 
230 (5th Cir. 1984). 
In State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213 (Utah 1991), a 
S.W.A.T. team stopped and searched a vehicle entering a 
cul-de-sac where the police were executing search warrants on 
three houses. Although defendant had backed his truck up and 
tried to leave after the S.W.A.T team had initially attempted to 
detain him, the court held the totality of the circumstances did 
not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver of the 
truck was involved in criminal activity. 
Id., at 216. 
In addition to noting that the officers were not 
uniformed, the court emphasized that there were no facts to link 
this particular person to the suspected illegal activities in the 
targeted houses. His mere presence in the area was insufficient 
to support a reasonable suspicion. Id. 
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This point is further developed in a case with facts 
almost identical to this case. The Court in State v. Carpena, 
714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986) found that the stop of the defendant in 
that case was an impermissible and unconstitutional stop. In 
Carpena an officer observed a slow moving vehicle in a 
neighborhood at 3:00 a.m. The vehicle had Arizona License 
plates. There had been a rash of burglaries reported in the 
neighborhood/ however none this night. The Court ruled: 
We find that the district court did not err in 
determining that the officer here had no 
reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory 
stop. The stop was based merely on the fact that 
a car with out-of-state license plates was moving 
slowly through a neighborhood late at night. The 
officer had no objective facts on which to base a 
reasonable suspicion that the men were involved in 
criminal activity. The ruling of the district 
court is affirmed. 
Id. 
In this case, Sergeant Evans stopped Davis because he 
saw Davis drive his van down the back streets of Summit at 2:00 
in the morning in a van with South Dakota plates. Sergeant Evans 
stop of Davis was unconstitutional and violative of Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953 as amended), which provides: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
Notwithstanding, Sergeant Evans indicated that his 
suspicion of Davis was further established by his association 
with a Mr. Blackburn at the Sunshine Truck Stop at Summit. (TT. 
at 64-66.) The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Munsen, 821 
P.2d 13 (1991), addressed this issue already. The Court stated: 
A "persons mere propinquity to others independently 
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suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, 
give rise to probable cause to search that person." 
Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91, 101 S. Ct. at 342. See Brown 
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-52, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641 
(1979) (mere presence in a neighborhood frequented by 
drug users does not give rise to reasonable suspicion); 
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593, 68 S. Ct. 
222, 228 (1948) ("Presumptions of guilt are not lightly 
to be indulged from mere meetings."); State v. Ramirez, 
159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 14 (Utah 1991) (no reasonable 
suspicion where man walking near defendant had run 
away). 
Id. In Munsun the court states that the mere association with an 
other person is not sufficient to create reasonable suspicion 
that the defendant has violated the law. In this case there is 
not even much of an association. The initial suspicion of the 
officer is based upon driving down the road at 2 A.M. and then 
going to a coffee shop (truck stop) thereafter being joined by 
someone else (there was no physical contact between the two) is 
not reasonable suspicion of anything. There is no logical 
manifestation of reasonable articulable facts which would lead a 
reasonable officer to believe that Davis had violated the law at 
the time Evans followed and stopped Davis and conducted his 
conversations with Davis. Davis was being suspected of criminal 
activity simply by association. When this information is 
communicated to the agents of Adult Parole and Probation it does 
not rise to a higher level of suspicion (by the mere fact that it 
has been communicated to another agency) nor automatically create 
constitutionally acceptable conduct by any of the police 
agencies. What Officer Evans observed in the early morning hours 
does not automatically gain constitutional acceptance in the 
early evening hours some 16 hours later, simply because it is now 
retold to an agent of Adult Parole and Probation. The over 
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inquisitiveness of the police in this situation has been 
addressed by the courts previously* In State v. Sims, 808 P. 2d 
141 (Utah Ct. App 1991) the court stated: 
Troopers Howard and Mangelson testified at some 
length about their expertise in drug interdiction, 
and the trial court treated the roadblock as if 
that was its primary purpose. However noble this 
purpose might be, it was pursued by an 
unauthorized means. The troopers each had years of 
law enforcement experience, and can properly be 
charged with awareness that their action was not 
authorized by law. "The greatest dangers to 
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of 
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding 
(emphasis added)." Olmstead v. United States, 277 
U.S. 438, 479, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Using ten to twelve 
law officers to staff the roadblock may have also 
left distant parts of the largely rural 
jurisdiction with delayed police assistance in the 
event of need. Thus, although it does not appear 
that the officers behaved abusively toward those 
stopped at the roadblock, this does not correct 
the constitutional violation. 
This sentiment is further clarified by the United States Supreme 
Court in United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) when they 
stated: 
But while the preservation of order is important 
to any society, the "needs of law enforcement 
stand in constant tension with the Constitution's 
protections of the individual against certain 
excerises of official power. It is precisely the 
predictability of these pressures that counsels a 
resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards." 
(citations omitted), (emphasis added) 
The officers who went to search the residence of Davis/Hyatt were 
following a hunch. They were not possessed of any reasonable 
articulabe suspicion that there was a violation of the law. 
As this Court looks at the facts and the law as they apply 
to Davis and Hyatt it should be blatantly obvious that nothing of 
which the officers were aware rose to the level of either 
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reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that either 
Davis or Hyatt had violated the law. 
MacArthyism died in the decade of the 1950s. It was a dark 
time in our history and we shouldn't return to such methods in 
the prosecution of criminal offenses. 
POINT II. 
THE ILLEGAL USE OF THE PROBATION AGREEMENT 
VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 
AFFORDING IN THE CONSTITUTIONS. 
In 1991, the Utah Court of Appeals adopted the parole 
reasonable suspicion standard in a probation context. Citing, 
State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1262 (Utah 1983). The fact 
that Davis was on probation is not cause enough in which to 
search either Davis or Hyatt or any of their belongings including 
vehicles and residence. 
The probation officers were still required to 
articulate a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed 
or was about to be committed, see State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 
205 (Utah App. 1991). There was absolutely no indication that 
either Davis or Hyatt were even remotely involved in any criminal 
activity. The search of the Davis/Hyatt residence and the 
vehicles located there was not supported by any reasonable 
articulable suspicion in the case of Davis or probable cause in 
the case of Hyatt that either Davis or Hyatt had violated any 
laws or that they were in the process of violating any laws or 
that they were about to violate any laws. One critical 
distinction must be noted here, and that is that Hyatt was not on 
the probation and a search of her residence and personal property 
must be supported by probable cause and/or a warrant issued by a 
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neutral magistrate. The search as it pertains to her possessions 
and residence is, in deed, illegal per se. 
The Court of Appeals addressed in State v. Harmon. 854 
P.2d 1037 (Utah 1993) what was required to demonstrate voluntary 
relinquishment of a Fourth Amendment protection. 
Consent to search is valid under the Fourth Amendment 
if (1) the consent was voluntarily given, and (2) the 
consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the 
prior illegality. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1262 (Utah 1993); Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 918. We apply 
a correction of error standard when a defendant 
challenges the "legal content" of the trial court's 
ultimate conclusion that a consent was voluntary or 
involuntary. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. The trial 
court's factual findings will not be set aside unless 
they are clearly erroneous. Id.; Barnhart, 210 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 35. 
Whether consent to search was voluntarily given is 
determined from the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the consent, including the characteristics 
of the accused and the details of the police conduct. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263; State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 
431, 437 (Utah App. 1990). In order for consent to be 
voluntary, (1) there must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was unequivocal, specific, 
and freely and intelligently given; (2) the government 
must prove consent was given without duress or 
coercion, express or implied; and (3) the courts must 
indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver 
of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be 
convincing evidence that such rights were waived. 
(emphasis added) State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah 
App. 1990), aff'd. 1993 WL 176211 (1993). 
Id. In the case at bar, neither Davis nor Hyatt, especially 
Hyatt, ever waived their Fourth Amendment protections. The State 
never demonstrated at any time that there was a knowing voluntary 
waiver by either of the defendants herein of any constitutional 
rights they have. The search on the co-Defendants' residence and 
personal property was illegal, thereby violating Article I, § 14 
of the Utah State Constitution. Pursuant to the Exclusionary 
Rule said evidence should have been properly suppressed and not 
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have been heard at the time of trial. 
POINT III, 
THE COURT WRONGFULLY CONVICTED DEFENDANT 
DAVIS OF POSSESSION OF STOLEN GOODS, 
In the case at bar there was not sufficient proof to 
convict the defendant of possession of stolen property with the 
intent to deprive the owner of said property. When indeed there 
was no proof presented at all that either of the tools were even 
stolen! One tool had been reported stolen more than a year prior 
to being recovered at Defendant's home. During the time the item 
was stolen and recovered it could have passed through ten or 
twenty hands. The second item was never reported stolen and 
there was NO testimony at all which would lead one to believe 
that the stapler was stolen. There was just no explanation as to 
how the item had come to leave Gore Manufacturing. "No 
explanation" does not rise to "proof beyond a reasonable doubt". 
These charges should have been dismissed by the Court at the 
conclusion of the State's case in chief when defendant so moved. 
The Court stated that it would not dismiss the charges when Judge 
Braithewaite said: 
"All right. If I was to sit on this case, I don't 
know how far I'd go on the router. But I'm not 
deciding this case, the jury is. With Mr. 
Balduck's testimony, I think there's enough to 
submit it to the jury. So that motion is denied. 
(TT. 414). 
THe Court also stated as to defense counsel's motion to dismiss 
the charges against defendant Hyatt the court stated: 
The motion is denied. We've just heard from two 
witnesses [Balduck and Bentley] that said that 
both of these defendants dealt drugs. (TT. 408). 
The testimony of Danny Balduck and Blake Bentley was 
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substantial in convicting defendants of any of the charges tried 
at trial. The prosecutor in this case, Scott Burns, told a 
reporter for the local news paper (The Saturday Spectrum, 
December 9, 1995, page 1, 11) that Danny Balduck played a very 
important role in the conviction of the defendant, in the article 
he said. 
Burns said what he felt was the most damaging 
evidence against Davis was the large amount of 
drugs found at the scene and the testimony of an 
inmate from the Utah State Prison in Draper. 
Danny Balduck, who is in the Utah State 
Prison for stealing an ATV [sic], testified that 
the night that Davis was arrested, Balduck came to 
his home to buy methamphetamine. 
"We had an inmate testify that was why he 
went to his house, to buy drugs," Burns said, "I 
think this was very damaging." 
At the time of trial the State (Scott Burns) stated: 
Well, I also think that it is very relevant that 
the testimony of Mr. Balduck and Mr. Bentley also 
went to the possession of stolen property. (TT. 
412) 
This statement made to Judge Braithewaite, pursuant to a defense 
motion, clearly points out the fact that the purpose of bringing 
these two witnesses to court to testify was to prejudice the jury 
and that the state INTENTIONALLY misrepresented their intentions 
to Judge Braithewaite or in the alternative out and out lied to 
Judge Braithewaite. Judge Braithewaite had just asked Mr. Burns 
to restate the purpose of the introduction of the testimony of 
Balduck and Bentley and Scott Burns replied: 
Identity, lack of mistake, modus operandi, 
knowledge, ability — all of those things. (TT. 
408) 
This statement by Scott Burns absolutely contradicts his real 
intent which was to present to the jury a series of events which 
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had no bearing upon the charges before the court, nor the 
question the jury was to decide, Scott Burns, INTENTIONALLY 
either misled the court or out and out lied to it. This is 
clearly prosecutorial misconduct. 
Neither Danny Balduck nor Blake Bentley should have played 
any role in defendants1 trial. Neither Danny Balduck nor Blake 
Bentley had anything to testify to which would assist the jury to 
determine whether or not defendant had possessed any controlled 
substances with the intent to distribute or possessed any stolen 
property with the intent to deprive the owner of the property on 
November 21, 1994* The issue before the court and the jury was 
the violations alleged in the Information, not conduct on any 
other occasion. Further the testimony of Agent Eckman creates a 
substantial risk that there was perjured testimony presented at 
the time of trial. At a minimum his testimony on at least two 
prior occasions did not place Danny Balduck in the vehicle which 
pulled up in front of defendant's home while the search was being 
conducted. 
CONCLUSION 
In the case at bar there was not at any time a reasonable 
suspicion articulated which would lead the probation officers to 
believe that there had been a violation of law committed by 
Davis. The basis for the search of defendants1 vehicles and home 
was innocent conduct observed by an officer under innocent 
circumstances. Further for the officers to search the home and 
possessions of defendant Hyatt they would need to rise to the 
level of probable cause, not just reasonable suspicion. With the 
increased level of constitutional protections afforded defendant 
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Hyatt the basis for the Motion to Suppress becomes even greater 
for her. The search of defendants1 residence and vehicles was 
clearly illegal under either standard, reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause. This Court should order the suppression of all 
evidence seized pursuant to the illegal search. 
The trial court erred in not dismissing the charges as to 
theft. The trial Court further erred in allowing Balduck and 
Bentley to testify. The misconduct of the prosecutor clearly 
prejudiced the jury, even in the prosecutor's own opinion as 
evidenced from the comments made by the prosecutor and as such 
the convictions on all counts should be dismissed or in the 
alternative overturned and remanded to the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 'S day of 
November, 1996. 
D. BRUCE O L I V E R " ^ 
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants 
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ADDENDUM A 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
ADDENDUM R 
Sec. 11. [Courts open - Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
ADDENDUM C 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden - Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized. 
ADDENDUM D 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
ADDENDUM E 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
ADDENDUM F 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; 
exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's 
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by 
the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character 
trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in 
a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first 
aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a 
witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
